By Adonis
Byemelwa
Uvira fell like a thunderclap,
sudden and impossible to ignore. It happened just as the region was still
exhaling after a highly publicised peace pact between Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and
the DRC’s Félix Tshisekedi, signed before former US President Donald Trump.
Hope filled the room, cameras rolled, pens moved, but on the ground, the guns
never fell silent.
That contradiction is what makes
Uvira so alarming. While diplomats spoke of a “new chapter,” M23 pushed closer
to Lake Tanganyika, turning words into smoke. For those of us who have followed
the DRC conflict for years, this pattern feels painfully familiar.
Agreements are signed far from the mud and
fear of eastern Congo, while armed groups keep redrawing reality with rifles.
Uvira is not just another town
on the map. It is a hinge, connecting eastern DRC to Burundi and opening
directly onto Lake Tanganyika. Whoever controls Uvira gains leverage over
movement, trade, and security across the Great Lakes. Its seizure by M23 places
an armed force uncomfortably close to Tanzania’s western shoreline, and that
proximity changes everything.
Along the Tanzanian side of the
lake, from Kagunga and Mwamgongo to Kagongo Ziwani, Kibirizi, and deep into
Kigoma South, anxiety is no longer abstract. Fishermen talk quietly about
strange boats at night, about armed men who do not speak Kiswahili like locals.
These are not rumours born of panic; they are the lived edges of a conflict
creeping across water.
The timing sharpens the unease.
The Kagame–Tshisekedi pact was sold as a turning point, a moment when regional
rivalry would finally give way to cooperation.
However, M23’s advance suggests
either a collapse of trust or a deliberate test of that agreement’s limits. If
a pact cannot restrain an allied rebel movement days or weeks after its
signing, what is it really worth?
Mussa Lugete, a political
analyst based in Dar es Salaam, puts it bluntly. “In the Great Lakes, peace
deals often function as diplomatic theatre,” he says. “They calm donors and
international partners, but they rarely discipline actors on the ground. Uvira
shows us the gap between paper peace and lived insecurity.”
That gap matters deeply for
Tanzania. Lake Tanganyika is not just water; it is a livelihood, border, and
buffer. Instability on its western shore does not stay there. Arms move easily
by boat, fighters melt into fishing communities, refugees arrive not as
statistics but as families with nothing left to lose.
Ibrahim Rabi, another Dar-based
analyst who has studied cross-border security for over a decade, warns against
underestimating the ripple effects. “When an armed group reaches the lake, the
conflict becomes regional by default,” he argues. “You cannot fence off water.
What happens in Uvira today shapes Kigoma tomorrow.”
Rwanda’s role lies at the heart
of this unrest. If M23 asserts control over Uvira, Kigali enhances its
influence on multiple levels. Politically, it strengthens its presence in
eastern DRC. Economically, it dominates routes long linked to illegal trade. Strategically,
it moves potential threats farther from its borders while increasing its
international bargaining power.
An international scholar on
African security, Professor Helen Marks of King’s College London, frames it in
colder terms. “This is classic strategic depth,” she notes. “By shaping
outcomes in Eastern Congo, Rwanda externalises its security concerns and negotiates
from a position of strength, regardless of what is signed at summits.”
For Burundi, the implications are
existential. Uvira has long been a corridor for Burundian forces cooperating
with FARDC and allied Mai-Mai groups. Its loss constrains Bujumbura’s options
and raises fears of increased pressure from armed opposition groups operating
across porous borders. A destabilised Burundi would not be a local problem; it
would be a regional shock.
Tanzania cannot pretend to be a
distant observer. History has taught hard lessons about what happens when the
Great Lakes tilt too far in one direction. The balance of power matters, and
when it breaks, consequences spill outward. This is not paranoia; it is pattern
recognition built from decades of crisis.
What makes the current moment
more unsettling is the international mood. With global attention fragmented by
wars elsewhere, African conflicts risk sliding down the priority list. Peace
pacts become symbols rather than instruments, while enforcement quietly
evaporates.
Jean-Paul Okello, a Ugandan-born
scholar teaching in South Africa, sees this as a dangerous drift. “When
high-level mediation is not matched by credible pressure and monitoring, armed
groups learn the wrong lesson,” he says. “They learn that violence still pays,
even after the handshakes.”
For communities along Lake
Tanganyika, these dynamics are not academic. Every shift in control across the
water changes daily calculations. Do you fish today or stay home? Do you report
what you saw last night or stay silent? Security, here, is felt in the body
before it is debated in parliament.
Tanzania’s response, therefore,
must be sober and strategic. Heightened lake security, deeper intelligence
cooperation with neighbours, and sustained diplomatic engagement are not acts
of aggression; they are acts of prevention. The goal is not escalation but
insulation, keeping regional fires from jumping the shoreline.
At the same time, Dar es Salaam
must read the Kagame–Tshisekedi pact with clear eyes. Its implication is not
that peace has arrived, but that a new phase of contestation has begun, one in
which influence is quietly exercised while violence continues through proxies.
Ignoring that reality would be costly.
Mussa Lugete reflects on this
tension with a note of frustration. “We keep celebrating agreements as
endpoints,” he says, “but in this region, they are often just intermissions.
The real test starts after the photos, when nobody is watching.”
International partners also
carry responsibility. Witnessing a pact, even at the highest level, is not the
same as guaranteeing its outcomes. Without follow-through, monitoring, and
consequences for violations, ceremonies risk becoming cover for continued
instability.
As someone who has tracked the
DRC conflict through failed ceasefires, shifting alliances, and recycled rebel
movements, the sense of déjà vu is heavy. Uvira feels less like a surprise and
more like a reminder that peace in the Great Lakes is never declared; it is
enforced day by day.
The danger now is complacency.
Believing that a signed document, however prestigious the witnesses, can
substitute for complex security realities. The lake does not read communiqués,
and armed groups do not pause for applause.
Tanzania’s strength has always
been its ability to think long, to absorb shocks without panic, and to act with
a steady sense of the region it inhabits. That habit of patience and strategic
calm matters now more than ever, especially as memories resurface of past
accords, Lusaka, Sun City, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, all signed with hope, all
followed by new mutations of the same conflict. The lesson, learned the hard
way, is that peace in eastern Congo has never been secured by signatures alone.
The seizure of Uvira is
therefore not just a Congolese problem, and the Kagame–Tshisekedi pact, however
grand the setting before President Trump, is not a guaranteed shield. Between
those two facts lies the unglamorous work of security, diplomacy, and vigilance.
As former Tanzanian foreign minister Liberata
Mulamula has often warned, “The DRC crisis is regional by nature, its solutions
must be regional in discipline, not just regional in rhetoric.” She has
repeatedly argued that without honest enforcement and shared responsibility,
agreements risk becoming pauses rather than endings.
For those of us who have watched this cycle repeat, the feeling is sobering. The region is watching quietly, not for speeches, but for who truly understands that difference and is prepared to act on it.